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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY








Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become
one in the near future. Although the state currently fails
to provide adequate security to its citizens or an
appropriate range of effective social programs, it does
supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound
economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).
Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats
represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and
urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the
under-resourced and compromised criminal justice
system. The UN-sponsored International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has
demonstrated that progress against organized crime is
possible.
The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan
state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to
taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on
short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a
coherent national reform program and mobilize public
support around it.
The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan
state by expanding the Central America Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting
CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
(TSE).

1

INTRODUCTION: FAILED STATES
In 2007, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Anders
Kompass publically labeled Guatemala a failed and
collapsed state. Other observers1 both inside and outside the
country have reached similar conclusions. With Mexican
drug trafficking organizations holding sway over large
sections of the nation, street gangs running rampant in
Guatemala City, and one of the world’s highest homicide
rates, such characterizations are understandable. However,
calling Guatemala a failed state is an exaggeration. As
serious as the nation’s security problems are, the Guatemalan
state is not nearing collapse. Indeed, it provides capable
macroeconomic management and the highest level of
electoral democracy since the early 1950s. In addition, after
decades of woefully inadequate efforts to address the needs
of the nation’s poor majority, social policy is finally making
progress via a new conditional cash transfer (CCT) program.
Risks of future state failure cannot be ignored, but
Guatemala does not yet resemble failed states such as
Zimbabwe or the Congo, much less Somalia.
Guatemala is a weak state that is performing poorly in many
policy areas, but adequately in others. Its most serious
vulnerabilities lie in the security area. Criminal activity has
become so widespread that it has overwhelmed efforts by
state authorities to bring it under control. Police and military
forces are small, underpaid, poorly trained, and infiltrated by
criminal elements. Too many prosecutors and judges have
been intimidated, corrupted, or killed. Guatemala may not
be a failed state, but it is failing at the critical task of
providing public order and the rule of law to its 14 million
citizens. Moreover, this failure threatens to undermine the
1

Gustavo González, “Guatemala: estado fallido,” La República, June 25,
2010; M. A. Bastenier, “¿Guatemala, estado fallido?” El País, January
21, 2008.
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nation’s progress in electoral politics as money from drug
trafficking seeps into campaign finance. Guatemala’s
deteriorating security situation also facilitates the northward
flow of narcotics and illegal immigrants that the United
States is struggling to contain.
To prevent further
deterioration, the United States and its allies should expand
the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to
provide more assistance to reform and strengthen
Guatemala’s law enforcement capabilities.
Additional
support also should be directed at consolidating
improvements in social policy and in the conduct of
elections.
There is no consensus definition of a failed state. Analysts
use the term in different ways and apply varying criteria for
state failure. The London School of Economics’ (LSE)
Crisis States Research Center, for example, defines a failed
state simply as one that has collapsed and “… that can no
longer perform its basic security and development functions
and that has no effective control over its territory and
borders.” 2 Rotberg,3 however, distinguishes among strong,
weak, failed, and collapsed states. He evaluates states by the
degree to which they deliver the most crucial political goods:
most importantly security, followed by political freedoms,
then by goods such as education, health care, and economic
opportunity. Strong states like those in Scandinavia perform
well across all categories, weak states show a mixed profile,
and failed states such as the Congo provide none or almost
none of these political goods. According to Rotberg, most
failed states are convulsed by internal violence and/or ruled
2

Jonathan Di John, Conceptualizing the Causes and Consequences of
Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature, Crisis States Working
Papers Series, No. 2 (London: LSE Development Studies Institute,
January 2008), 9-10.
3
Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States:
Causes and Indicators,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, IN: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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by despotic regimes. Rare collapsed states like Somalia fail
in every respect and can be completely destroyed by
violence. In spite of its security crisis, Guatemala does not,
as yet, meet either the LSE or the less stringent Rotberg
definition of a failed state. The country ranks 73rd of 177
nations (Somalia ranks first) on the 2011 Failed States
Index,4 scoring about the same as China, a result that earns
only a warning of possible future state failure. Guatemala
appears to be most accurately classified as one of Rotberg’s
weak states that are failing at some of their essential tasks.
INSECURITY
In many ways, Guatemala is more dangerous today than it
was during all but the most intense periods of its more than
30 years of guerrilla war (1960s-1996). From 2000 to 2010,
the nation’s homicide rate doubled to 50 per 100,000,
equivalent to ten times the U.S. level. Forty percent of
murders are attributed to the narcotics trade, 5 and fewer than
four percent result in an arrest and conviction. Significant
quantities of narcotics have been moving across Guatemala
since the 1980s, but the drug traffic has skyrocketed in recent
years. An estimated 250 to 350 metric tons of cocaine now
transit Guatemala annually. The greatest number of cocaine
shipments arrives from Colombia or Ecuador by sea on the
largely unpatrolled Pacific coast where they are broken up
into smaller packages for the trip to Mexico by truck. Air
routes to the Petén and Alta Verapaz as well as land routes
from Honduras are also important. In addition, Guatemala
exports a small poppy crop for heroin production and
imports large quantities of pseudoephedrine for shipment to

4

Fund for Peace, accessed on June 23, 2011,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/?q=fsi.
5
The Economist, “The Tormented Isthmus,” April 16, 2011, 26.
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Mexico for processing into methamphetamine.6 The porous
Guatemalan-Mexican border poses no obstacle.
Traditionally, Guatemalan “transportista” crime families
have handled the movement of cocaine through the country
for international drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), but
since about 2006 Mexican DTOs, particularly the infamous
Zetas, have begun to exert more direct control. The Zetas
have also carried their battle with the Sinaloa cartel into
Guatemala as both organizations have moved some
operations there (training camps, arms caches, safe houses)
in response to Mexico’s intensified anti-drug campaign. The
Zetas’ violent conflicts with their enemies have caused a
rising body count. Mexican DTOs also engage in a variety
of other criminal activities in Guatemala including human
trafficking and extortion.
Drug traffickers are most active in eight of Guatemala’s 22
departments: Huehuetenango and San Marcos (which border
Mexico in the south); the tropical Petén in the north; Zacapa
and Izabal on the Honduran border; rugged Alta Verapaz and
Quiché in the center; and Jutiapa on the Pacific coast.
Narcotraffickers operate with relative impunity in their areas
of control and now contest state authority in about half of the
country. Massive financial resources and superior weaponry
(armor-piercing ammunition, fragmentation grenades) enable
Mexican DTOs to coopt or coerce local cooperation
wherever they go.
Guatemalan and foreign drug traffickers have long
collaborated with well-connected clandestine security
networks that Guatemalans refer to as the “parallel or hidden
powers.” These domestic criminal organizations provide
intelligence and high-level political contacts to clients and
6

U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Vol. I, March 2011, 270-272.
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carry out a wide range of criminal activities on their own
(arms trafficking, money laundering, and extortion). Parallel
powers initially grew out of Guatemalan military intelligence
(D-2) which directed the armed forces’ successful
counterinsurgency campaign. While still in uniform, senior
officers like General Francisco “Paco” Ortega Menaldo7
formed secret organizations such as the Cofradía
(Brotherhood) and put their skills to criminal uses. In 1996,
the former military intelligence chief was cashiered from the
army for his alleged participation in a contraband ring with
customs officials. He resurfaced in 2000 as the top security
advisor to President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) who is
himself now under U.S. indictment for money laundering.
From this position, Ortega Menaldo exercised control over
all military appointments despite the fact that the U.S.
government signaled its disapproval by withdrawing his visa
on suspicion of drug trafficking. 8 More recently, President
Alvaro Colom (2008-2012) also has relied on Ortega
Menaldo’s security advice, and the former general has
reasserted his influence over the military hierarchy. 9 The
Cofradía has long since splintered into different factions, and
new parallel powers unconnected to military intelligence
have arisen, but Ortega Menaldo’s network is still
formidable. These criminal organizations have placed agents
throughout Guatemala’s government and criminal justice
system.

7

Michael Deibert, “Guatemala’s Death Rattle: Drugs vs. Democracy,”
World Policy Journal 25, no. 4, (Winter 2008/2009): 170.
8
J. Mark Ruhl, “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: The
Fate of Reform Under Arzú and Portillo,” Latin American Politics and
Society 47 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 68-69.
9
José Rubén Zamora, “El regreso de Ortega Menaldo,” El Periódico,
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An estimated 14,000 urban gang members10 constitute
another growing source of criminal activity. Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its smaller rival Calle 18/Mara 18
(M-18), both of which originated in Los Angeles, California,
control major sections of Guatemala City’s poor barrios.
These transnational criminal organizations dominate the
retail sale of narcotics and extort money from businesses,
bus drivers, and residents. More than 170 bus drivers and
other transportation workers were murdered by gangs in
2010.11 MS-13 and M-18 also engage in kidnapping,
robbery, car theft, and murder for hire. Both gangs recruit
locally among the urban poor and welcome members who
continue to be deported from the United States. The gangs’
relationships with DTOs and the parallel powers are not well
understood. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA)
claims that the Sinaloa cartel has contracted Mara
Salvatrucha to move drugs and human cargo. 12
A WEAK CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Guatemala’s National Civilian Police (PNC), its Public
Ministry (Attorney General’s Office), and its courts have
proven too weak to handle the security challenges posed by
drug traffickers, parallel powers, and urban gangs. The
police force numbers only 25,500 with about one-fifth of its
officers relegated to guarding government buildings and
individuals. Only a small number of PNC officers are
assigned to important drug trafficking departments such as
10

See Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case
Study in the Erosion of the State (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, May 2010), 24.
11
Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America Regional
Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2011), 10.
12
Megan McAdams, “Bloodshed in Guatemala as Cartels and Street
Gangs Wage War,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Last modified
March 7, 2011. http://www.coha.org.
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Alta Verapaz (415 officers).13 Guatemalan police are illtrained, underequipped, and poorly paid. A great many of
them engage in criminal activity themselves or take bribes to
ignore crimes committed by others. Morale can scarcely be
high in a police force where senior officers are regularly
sacked for corruption. In 2009, the PNC’s general director,
assistant director, and director for operations were all fired
over 100 kilograms of missing cocaine. Not surprisingly,
only 31 percent of Guatemalans express trust in the police,
the second lowest level in the Americas.14 Individuals and
businesses that can afford to do so, have acquired private
security, ballooning the nation’s private security force to
125,000. Poorer Guatemalans sometimes resort to vigilante
justice, e.g., lynching of suspected criminals.
The Public Ministry does not have enough trained
prosecutors, forensics experts, or investigators, and it
contains too many officials of doubtful loyalty. Constant
turnover in leadership has also impeded consistent policy
formation. Parallel powers have sometimes succeeded in
influencing the selection of the Attorney General and other
senior office holders. In addition, Guatemala’s courts are
notoriously slow, bound by archaic procedures, and open to
manipulation by criminal defendants. Too few convictions
result. Frustrated by low conviction rates, police regularly
bypass the judicial process with extrajudicial killings of gang
members and other suspected criminals.
The failure of civilian law enforcement institutions has led
Guatemalans from all social classes to demand that the
13

Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America:
Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, Working Paper Series on
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28.
14
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military reassume a greater role in internal security in spite
of its authoritarian history and the well-documented human
rights abuses of the guerrilla war. The armed forces were
downsized by two-thirds to 15,500 effectives after the 1996
Peace Accords and redeployed out of their rural
counterinsurgency bases. The removal of the military made
it easier for drug traffickers to operate in these vacated areas.
Despite protests from his leftist supporters, President Alvaro
Colom has been forced by the security situation to enlarge
the armed forces to over 17,000, expand its participation in
urban law enforcement, and send it back into some of its
former areas of operation. Colom has placed soldiers on city
buses and increased joint patrols with the police. The
military has constructed a new base in Quiché, and several
hundred troops have been dispatched with temporary state of
siege powers to Alta Verapaz and Petén. Unfortunately, the
army is untrained in counter-narcotics operations and lacks
necessary communications equipment, transportation, and air
support.15
The most positive development on the security front has
been the arrival of the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). In 2007, a determined
coalition of politicians and civil society convinced reluctant
legislators to agree to a United Nations (UN) plan to create
CICIG to help local prosecutors and police fight organized
crime. The externally-financed commission is composed of
experienced law enforcement professionals from around the
world who have taught new investigative and prosecutorial
techniques, vetted candidates for senior law enforcement
positions, and made recommendations for changes to
Guatemala’s legal code.16 CICIG has also spearheaded a
15

Matthew B. Greco, Ungoverned Spaces in Guatemala and U.S.
National Security, U.S. Army War College Program Research Project,
May 4, 2009, 6.
16
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number of high-profile investigations and raised the morale
of honest Guatemalan law enforcement personnel. Although
the commission has experienced its share of disappointments
and controversy, it has compiled an impressive list of
achievements in a short period:


CICIG investigators solved the bizarre Rosenberg
murder case17 that threated to bring down the
Colom government. Before arranging his own
assassination, prominent businessman Rodrigo
Rosenberg had recorded a videotape falsely
blaming his murder on the President.



CICIG was responsible for purging the PNC of
over 2,000 corrupt police officers including 50
senior officials. Two former PNC Directors and
their chief assistants were later convicted and
imprisoned. Ten compromised Public Ministry
prosecutors resigned under pressure.



CICIG increased the transparency of the
nominating process for attorney generals and
judges and prevented a number of individuals
with suspected criminal ties from gaining these
high offices.



CICIG persuaded the Guatemalan Congress to
pass laws giving police and prosecutors powerful
new crime-fighting tools (legal wiretaps, witness
protection program, plea bargaining options, asset
seizure law).

17

See David Grann, “A Murder Foretold,” The New Yorker, April 4,
2011.
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CICIG played a key role in preventing the escape
of indicted former President Alfonso Portillo to
Belize, and the commission is appealing his
acquittal on embezzlement charges while
supporting a U.S. request for his extradition.
CICIG has also been instrumental in the
indictment of many other high-ranking civilian
and military officials several of whom have been
convicted.
Convictions of murderers, drug
traffickers, and kidnappers have accelerated.

Despite uneven cooperation from Guatemalan governmental
institutions, CICIG has shown that the criminal justice
system can be made to work. In 2009, the Guatemalan
Congress extended CICIG’s mandate through September
2011, and President Colom has requested that the legislators
do so again for an additional two years. A U.S.-supported
Police Reform Commission headed by noted human rights
activist Helen Mack also has begun to complement CICIG’s
work.
The Guatemalan state is still doing a poor job of providing
security for its citizens, but with international assistance its
performance has begun to show some improvement.
Murders and kidnappings are down slightly, and seizures of
guns, drugs, and cash are up. With the support of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Guatemalan security forces have substantially reduced drug
flights into the Petén and captured important traffickers such
as San Marcos drug boss Juan Ortiz López. According to the
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), fewer
Guatemalans (40%) feel insecure in their neighborhoods than
in 2004.18 In fact, Guatemala’s perceived insecurity rate fell
18

Dinorah Azpuru, Cultura política de la democracia en Guatemala,
2010 (Nashville, TN: LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, December 2010),
76.
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to about the Latin American average in 2010. Nevertheless,
in the same survey, 23 percent of Guatemalans claimed that
they themselves or someone in their family had been
victimized by crime in the last 12 months. Crime and
insecurity remained the number one public issue in national
polls.
A NEGLECTED M AJORITY
Traditionally, the Guatemalan state has also failed to
adequately address the basic social needs of its poor
majority. Public education and health care have been sorely
neglected, and until recently significant anti-poverty
programs were unknown. Guatemala ranks next to last in the
Americas on the Human Development Index (HDI). Almost
half of Guatemalan children are chronically malnourished,
and the average child completes just four years of school. 19
Half of the population lives on under US$ 2 a day, and an
extremely poor 15 percent survive on less than a dollar a
day. Income and wealth in Guatemala have been distributed
very unequally since colonial times. Today the top 20
percent of income earners amass 58 percent of income,20 and
the largest 3 percent of landed estates encompass almost
two-thirds of all agricultural land21 in a country where half of
the population still lives in the rural areas. Poverty,
inequality, and a lack of social mobility promote crime as
well as illegal migration to the United States.
The Guatemalan state’s inability to deliver crucial political
goods, like security, education, and basic economic
19

“The Tormented Isthmus,” 25-26.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Guatemala at a Glance,
accessed June 15, 2011,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemala_statistics.html.
21
“Torres Clears Final Hurdle,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 20,
2011, 4.
20
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assistance, has undermined its legitimacy. Except for
Hondurans, Guatemalans were the least likely to say that
their nation was “making progress” in the 2010
Latinobarómetro poll.22 Only 28 percent of Guatemalans
expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works in
their country. Almost half of Guatemalans, nonetheless, still
preferred democracy to any other political system, but this
represented the weakest endorsement for democracy in any
Latin American country. Lukewarm support for democracy
leaves Guatemala vulnerable to the future appeals of
authoritarian, populist politicians offering simple solutions to
the country’s security and development problems.
The Guatemalan state has failed to fight crime effectively or
improve social conditions primarily because it has been
starved for financial resources and led by an ineffectual
political class. Tax revenue represents only 10.3 percent of
GDP,23 one of the very lowest levels in the Americas. The
nation’s traditional economic elite has fought successfully to
keep income taxes low. Guatemala’s wealthy claim that
politicians and bureaucrats would only waste or steal
additional funds. Certainly the nation’s self-interested
political class does not inspire confidence. The majority of
Guatemalan politicians enter politics to gain power and
money for themselves and patronage for their followers.
They accept financial support24 from whatever elite or even
criminal interests will help them win office. Politicians
organize ephemeral, personalistic political parties that stand
for little and disappear when their political bosses’ fortunes

22

“The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist,
December 4, 2010, 51.
23
U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, 270.
24
See Anita Isaacs, “Guatemala on the Brink,” Journal of Democracy 21
no. 2 (April 2010): 115.
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fade.25 Elected legislators switch parties at will and supply
no dependable legislative coalitions for Guatemala’s oneterm presidents to lead. Political corruption appears to have
declined since alleged embezzler Alfonso Portillo left office
in 2004; but the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
still classifies the country’s corruption level as “serious.” It
is little wonder that ordinary Guatemalans have so little
respect for political parties.
ELECTIONS,
MIFAPRO

ECONOMIC

M ANAGEMENT ,

AND

Unlike failed states such as Zimbabwe or the Congo, the
Guatemalan state is doing some things reasonably well. The
respected Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has conducted
three free and fair general elections since the Peace Accords
leading Freedom House to classify Guatemala as an electoral
democracy. In 2007, Alvaro Colom of the National Unity of
Hope (UNE) became the first elected president from the left
in more than half a century. He rode to office on increased
voting turnout by the rural indigenous poor that, in turn had
been made possible by electoral reforms sponsored by his
predecessor. The indigenous Mayan population constitutes
at least 50 percent of the nation and has long been the victim
of severe discrimination. Although the elections were
marred by more than 50 murders of political activists and
candidates and by the suspected influence of drug money,
these contests represented continued democratic progress for
a nation that was ruled by the armed forces for over forty
years. The upcoming September 2011 elections will be a
fourth test of the electoral system. Conservative former
general Otto Pérez Molina of the Patriot Party (PP) who
finished second in 2007 is heavily favored. Guatemalan
25

Omar Sánchez, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in
Underutilization, Latin American Politics and Society 50 no. 1 (Spring
2008).
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politicians, whatever their defects, appear, for now, to have
accepted the basic rules of democratic electoral competition.
No failed states are electoral democracies.
Active participation by organized groups from across the
political spectrum also has become well-established in onceheavily-repressive Guatemala.
Not just the elite
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial,
Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF), but also
human rights organizations, indigenous groups, and labor
unions can make themselves heard, although those on the left
still risk physical harm when they do. LAPOP surveys show
that Guatemalans participate in religious and community
groups and municipal meetings more than most other Latin
Americans.26
The Guatemalan state also provides capable macroeconomic
management. International Monetary Fund (IMF) targets for
fiscal and monetary policy are met regularly, and the
nation’s public debt amounts to only 20 percent of GDP.
Guatemala’s representatives have negotiated favorable
international trade accords such as the Dominican RepublicCentral America-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR). It is true that Guatemalan economic growth
has trailed Latin American averages in recent years, but there
have been none of the sharp, prolonged economic declines
typical of failed states. Both foreign investment and tourism
currently are on the rise. Economic performance, however,
would be much stronger if crime and violence did not cost
the nation an estimated 7.7 percent of GDP27 (security costs,
26

Azpuru, Cultura política, 151, 155.
World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A
Developmental Challenge, Sustainable Development Department and
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and
the Caribbean Region (2011), 6, accessed June 17, 2011,
http://www.worldbank.org/lac..
27
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higher insurance, theft) and discourage higher levels of
investment. Employers also lament workers’ low skills and
gaps in economic infrastructure, but Guatemala benefits
from its wide variety of exports (coffee, bananas, sugar,
crude oil, and textiles) and about US$ 4 billion in
remittances from citizens working abroad.
Social policy is finally showing signs of progress too. Life
expectancy (71) and literacy rates (80%) have edged upward
in recent years while infant and maternal mortality rates have
fallen. Primary school attendance and infant immunization
rates have increased.
Most importantly, the Colom
government initiated a popular conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program called My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO) in
2008 that pays poor families US$ 40 every month as long as
their children attend school and undergo required health
checkups. MIFAPRO is patterned after highly successful
anti-poverty programs in Mexico and Brazil. The
Guatemalan CCT currently provides benefits to 814,625
families who represent almost half of the country’s
extremely poor households at the cost of less than one-tenth
of one percent of GDP. 28 MIFAPRO has been directed by
President Colom’s wife Sandra Torres who has resisted
transparent record-keeping and tried to use the program to
win the political allegiance of beneficiary families, but a
recent intervention by the Constitutional Court has reduced
her influence. Even conservatives like Pérez Molina now
recognize that dismantling MIFAPRO would entail too great
a political cost.

28

Simone Cecchini, “Do CCT Programmes Work in Low-Income
Countries?” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth One
Pager, no. 90 (July 2009).
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GUATEMALA’S FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Guatemala is unlikely to become a failed state in the near
term. An electoral democracy is in place despite its flaws,
economic management is prudent, and a new conditional
cash transfer program is beginning to address poverty issues.
Security problems are extremely serious, but CICIG has
shown that progress even here may be possible. In order to
become a failed state like Zimbabwe or the Congo, the
Guatemalan state’s mixed performance in providing political
goods would have to deteriorate dramatically. The greatest
potential for such a state failure lies in the further expansion
of the Mexican DTO invasion and deeper involvement of
drug traffickers in Guatemalan electoral politics.
Indicators that the risk of state failure in Guatemala is
becoming very serious could include;
1. A complete breakdown of the electoral system
involving the use of violence on a broad scale by
major political competitors;
2. A takeover of formal political power by drugtrafficking organizations (thinly disguised);
and/or,
3. A sharp, extended decline in GDP.
In contrast, a major strengthening of the state could be
indicated by such developments:
1. A large increase in tax revenue via a new income
tax;
2. A thorough reform and expansion of the PNC by
50 percent or more;

17

3. The de-politicization and enlargement of
MIFAPRO to cover 100 percent of the nation’s
extremely poor.
While Guatemala is unlikely to become a failed state
anytime soon, it is also difficult to imagine such positive
improvements as these in the current political context.
Reformist President Colom lacked the legislative majority to
pass even modest fiscal reform measures much less more farreaching programs. Moreover, his party, --the Unidad
Nacional de la Esperanza [National Unity for Hope (UNE)]
-- is no more ideologically coherent or deeply rooted among
ordinary people than any others in Guatemala. Colom also
accepted campaign money from many questionable donors
and sought security advice from a former general who is
reputed to lead one of the parallel powers. Guatemala is
most likely to remain a weak and troubled state for the
foreseeable future.
The next Guatemalan president will probably be
conservative Otto Pérez Molina whose Patriot Party (PP)
symbol is a clenched fist. Many analysts perceive him to be
an extreme right-wing politician and link him to human
rights crimes and parallel powers. However, evidence for
the most damaging accusations against him is weak,29 and it
is worth remembering that Pérez Molina was considered one
of the army’s most prominent moderate officers in the 1990s.
He played a key pro-democracy role in blocking President
Jorge Serrano’s attempted coup in 1993 and helped negotiate
the Peace Accords which many others in the armed forces
had resisted. Although Pérez Molina will not be friendly to
innovative social policies, his thorough understanding of
Guatemala’s law enforcement institutions should help him to
29

Claims that Pérez Molina was involved in the 1998 assassination of
Bishop Juan Gerardi are particularly unconvincing inasmuch as they are
based on the accusations of a single, unreliable source.
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address the nation’s security crisis. The PP leader is also a
longtime enemy30 of ex-general Ortega Menaldo whose
influence will decline after the new president takes office.
Pérez Molina’s elite supporters will not want him to pursue
meaningful tax reform, but if anyone could accomplish this
goal in Guatemala it would probably be someone with
conservative credentials such as his.
What should the United States and the international
community do to address Guatemala’s vulnerabilities and
increase the chances that the state will become stronger
rather than weaker in coming years? The first step for the
United States should be to greatly expand its Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). CARSI
began in FY2008 as part of the Bush administration’s Mérida
Initiative and emerged as a separate program in FY2010. 31
CARSI currently supplies equipment (weapons, X-ray cargo
scanners, night vision goggles, radios, and helicopters),
training for specialized vetted units, and technical assistance
(community-policing techniques) to more trustworthy
elements within Guatemalan law enforcement. It also funds
programs to deal with the social conditions that contribute to
crime (at-risk youth activities). Unfortunately, with the US
government focused on drug trafficking in Mexico, CARSI
has been underfunded. The US$ 100 million that President
Obama administration requested for CARSI for all of the
Central America countries in FY2011 is woefully
insufficient to have the desired effect on Guatemala’s multidimensional security crisis. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, however, promised more generous security
assistance at the June 2011 Central American Security
Conference. In addition, the World Bank and Inter30
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American Development Bank together pledged US$ 1.5
billion to fight organized crime in the region.
The United States and its allies should also lobby for the
continuation and expansion of the United Nations’ CICIG
mission and continue to support the work of the new Police
Reform Commission.
In addition, the international
community must stand ready to protect the independence of
the
Supreme
Electoral
Tribunal
(TSE)
whose
professionalism undergirds Guatemala’s electoral democracy
and to assist the TSE as it develops its capacity to monitor
campaign finance sources.32 Deeper involvement of rival
drug traffickers in political campaigns would subvert the
democratic process and raise the potential for increased
political violence. Another high international priority should
be support for the de-politicization and expansion of
MIFAPRO, a CCT program which has the potential to
reduce extreme poverty substantially.
International efforts alone, however, will never be able to
strengthen the Guatemalan state sufficiently to end concerns
about its possible failure. A segment of Guatemala’s
political elite must develop the vision and political will to
reform the tax code, the criminal justice system, and social
policy so as to create a context in which international
assistance can be most effective. A reform coalition is
desperately needed. Regrettably, Guatemala lacks a strong,
policy-oriented, mass-based political party that could
develop a coherent national reform plan and mobilize public
support around it.

32
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